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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDIANA'S CIVIL CHANGE OF
VENUE LAW: CHANGE FOR THE SAKE OF CHANGE
In 1964, Indiana effectively eliminated the traditional causal requirement for change of venue' by the adoption of Trial Rule 76.
Historically, venue change was permitted to insure the moving party a
fair trial.2 At the same time, the opposing party was protected from
frivolous motions by the requirement that change be justified.' Under
1. Im. TraAx. R. 76 (promulgated in its present form in 1964 as Supreme Court
Rule 1-12B, 244 Ind. xxix (1964)).
2. State ex rel. Fox v. LaPorte Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 69, 74, 138 N.E.2d 875,
878 (1956); The Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 80-81, 29
N.E. 393, 394 (1891); cf. State ex rel. Kielpikowski v. Murray, 240 Ind. 222, 163
N.E.2d 597 (1960); State ex rel. Janelle v. Lake Superior Court, 237 Ind. 3, 143
N.E.2d 288 (1957).
3. All Indiana statutory provisions dealing with change of venue have enumerated
specific instances in which a change of venue must be granted. These have been held
to be exclusive on the ground that the legislature had determined that a change of
venue would result in a fairer trial only in these enumerated instances. If none of
these circumstances existed, the interests of the party opposing the change would
outweigh the negligible possibility of a fairer trial. State ex rel. Young v. Niblack,
229 Ind. 509, 99 N.E.2d 252 (1951).
The most recent statute required that an affidavit be filed alleging one of seven
specific grounds:
First. That the judge has been engaged as counsel in the cause, prior
to his election or appointment as judge, or is otherwise interested in the cause,
or,
Second. That the judge is of kin to either party, or,
Third. That the opposite party has an undue influence over the citizens
of the county, or that an odium attaches to the applicant, or to his cause of
action or defense, on account of local prejudice, or,
Fourth. When the county is a party to the suit, or,
Fifth. Showing to the satisfaction of the court that the convenience of
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change, or,
Sixth. That the judge of the court wherein such action is pending, is a
material witness for the party for such change, or,
Seventh. When either party shall make and file an affidavit of the
bias, prejudice or interest of the judge before whom the said cause is pending.
Ch. 38. § 255, [1881] Ind. Acts Spec. Sess. 240, 285, IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1401 (1967)
(codified at IND. CoDE § 34-1-13-1 (1971)).
The requirement of an affidavit was considered to be a safeguard against the filing
of spurious motions for change of venue because the filing of a false affidavit could
result in a prejury conviction or disbarment State ex rel. Ray v. Veneman, 209 Ind.
575, 200 N.E. 216 (1936) ; cf. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) ; Witter v.
Taylor, 7 Ind. 110 (1855). The requirement was in force until 1955, when the Indiana
Supreme Court promulgated rule 1-12B, which stated that the motion must be granted
upon an unverified application specifically stating the grounds for change. 234 Ind.
xxxviii (1955).
The reasons for allowing change only in certain specific cases have been stated by
the Indiana Supreme Court as follows:
It is apparent that the legislature, in the enactment of the statute governing
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present Trial Rule 76, venue change must be granted in virtually all
civil cases,' regardless of cause, provided that the moving party meet
the requisite time limitations.5 As a result, change of venue today is
changes of venue, sought to accomplish a double purpose. It was designed,
primarily, to enable litigants to remove their causes from an atmosphere of prejudice and unfairness to a locality where they might find fair and unbiased
triers, with surroundings not tainted by an undeserved odium affecting them
or their cause. At the same time they wished, so far as possible to limit the
nischief that might be done by those whose only wish was delay, and the
hindrance of jistice.
Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 80-81, 29 N.E. 393, 394 (1891)
(emphasis added). Accord, State ex rel. Fox v. LaPorte Circuit Court, 236 Ind.
69, 74, 138 N.E.2d 875, 878 (1956) ; see also State ex tel. Welty v. Allen Superior Court,
243 Ind. 378, 185 N.E.2d 617 (1962) ; State ex tel. Young v. Niblack, 229 Ind. 509, 99
N.E.2d 252 (1952); cf. State ex tel. Neal v. Superior Court of Marion County, 202
Ind. 456, 174 N.E. 732 (1931); Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind. App. 563, 104 N.E. 309
(1914).
4. In all cases where the venue of a civil action may now be changed from
the judge or the county, such change shall be granted upon the filing of an
unverified application or motion without specifically stating the ground therefor ...
IND. TRIAL R. 76(1).
The rule does not explicitly state that a motion for change must be granted regardless of the grounds for the motion. It has generally been assumed that the words, "[i]n
all cases where the venue of a civil action may now be changed," refer, among other
things, to the seven causes set forth in the statute requiring an affidavit. State ex rel. Red
Cab v. Shelby Circuit Court, 243 Ind. 127, 132, 183 N.E.2d 336, 338 (1962); State
ex tel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394, 402, 157 N.E.2d 475, 479 (1959) ; 4
W. HARVEY & R. TOWNSEND, INDIANA PRACTIcE, RuLEs OF PROCEDURE ANNOTATED
551-61 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HARVEY].
Since the present rule states that no reasons for the change need be stated, however, a change must be granted as a matter of right. The court can no longer consider the issue of cause. See State ex tel. Dunn v. Lake Juvenile Court, 248 Ind. 324,
288 N.E.2d 16 (1967), where the respondent judge stated that he denied the relator's
motion for a change of venue because she did not specifically state a ground for change
as required by the statute, and because no cause existed. Relator stated that cause
did exist, although she did not specify the cause in her motion. The Supreme Court
completely disregarded the issue of cause, stating that Court Rule 1-12B (now Trial
Rule 76) superceded the statute and that therefore a change of venue must be granted
upon compliance with the rule. This holding was in line with previous decisions in
which it was held that a motion for change of venue must be granted upon compliance
with the applicable rule. State ex tel. Ray v. Veneman, 209 Ind. 575, 578, 200 N.E.
216, 218 (1936), and cases cited therein; Moore v. Fletcher, 136 Ind. App. 478, 508,
196 N.E.2d 422, 439 (1964), and cases 6ited therein. See cases cited in Note, Change
of Venue and Change of Judge in a Civil Action in Indiana: Proposed Reforms, 38
IND. L.J. 289, 295 n.31 & 32 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Reforms]. But see
Riggenberg v. Hartman, 102 Ind. 537, 26 N.E. 91 (1885) ; Houser v. Laughlin, 55 Ind.
App. 563, 104 N.E. 309 (1914) (held, the lower court was justified in not granting a
motion for a change of venue, even though the motion was made by affidavit in due
form, when the moving party virtually admitted that he had made the motion only for
purposes of delay).
5. IND. TRIAL R. 76(2)-(7). In addition to time limitations, there are other
requirements, such as the presence of adverse parties. State ex tel. Stockton v. Leopold,
227 Ind. 426, 86 N.E.2d 530 (1949). Moreover, change of venue cannot be granted upon
the final report of the executor of an estate. State ex tel. Draper v. Roszkowski, 248
Ind. 590, 230 N.E.2d 296 (1967).
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regularly abused,' often being utilized to delay," harass, and inconvenience opponents.' While Trial Rule 76 has been a useful tool in the artful
attorney's bag of tricks, recent developments suggest that the Rule may
b ! unconstitutional. Such a holding might rest on the finding that, in
tertain circumstances, automatic changes of venue (1) violate due process
by denying access to the courts, (2) violate due process and equal protection by effectively depriving a person of his property without a
hearing, or (3) violate the right to a speedy trial which is guaranteed by
Article 1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution.
DENIAL OF ACCESS TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS-PLAINTIFFS

A motion granted under Trial Rule 76 may effectively deny plaintiffs
access to the court system. Whenever a change of venue from the county
Several other general requirements and their application are discussed in HARvEY,
.supra note 4, at 551-61; Proposed Reforms, supra note 4; Note, Change of Judge in
Indiana: A Continuing Dilemma, 2 IND. L.F. 164 (1968).
6. Even prior to the 1964 Rule, the right to a change of venue was often abused.
Lowe, President's Annual Address, 23 IND. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1947) ; see City of Evansville
v. Baumeyer, 245 Ind. 643, 648, 199 N.E.2d 472, 475 (1964), wherein the court stated
that it was "judicially aware" that the right to a change of venue is abused frequently
for purposes of delay.
7. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hohlt v. Superior Court of Marion County, Ind.
-270 N.E.2d 761 (1971), wherein a motion for change of venue, utilized to avoid a
default judgment, was granted. As a result, a dilatory party was rewarded for his
delaying tactics with further delay. See also note 6 supra.
8. This practice is illustrated in Slocum v. Jacobson, Civ. No. 71-H-344 (N.D.
Ind., filed Dec. 17, 1971), where one of the defendant insurance companies virtually
admitted in its answer that it and other insurance companies seek change of venue only
to inconvenience plaintiffs.
The same case is pending in the Indiana Supreme Court under the name of State
ex rel. Bicanic v. Lake Circuit Court, Civil No. 472-S-44 (Ind. S. Ct, filed Apr. 18,
1972) (petition for writ of mandate to compel court to deny motion for change of
venue). In Bicanic plaintiffs pointed out the severe financial burden which would be
imposed on them if a change of venue were granted:
Plaintiffs are forced to bear the burden of increased attorney expenses for
travel and additional expense to produce witnesses a further distance to the
surrounding counties. Specifically, substantial additional expense results
for all witnesses and especially for expert witnesses, such as doctors, who
must be paid as much as $500 to $1,000 to appear in remote counties when they
would charge $150 to $250 to appear locally. Such costs are not taxable and
must always be borne by plaintiff. It is about sixty-five (65) miles to Kentland and over two (2) hours driving round trip. It is abiout sixty-five (65)
miles to Rensselaer and over two (2) hours round trip. It is about thirty
(30) to forty (40) miles to Valparaiso and over one (1) hour round trip.
These are the county seats of the three (3) surrounding counties to which
a case may be venued pursuant to Trial Rule 76. . . . Minimum per diem
is $35.00 per hour in Hammond. Twelve (12) cents a mile is reasonable
auto expense.
Relator's Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion for Change of Venue at 40, State
ex reL. Bicanic v. Lake Circuit Court, Civil No. 472-S-44 (Ind. S. Ct., filed Apr. 18,
1972).
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is granted to a defendant, it will almost invariably make it more inconvenient for the plaintiff to prosecute his case. Not only are individual
travelling expenses incurred, but substantial resources in excess of those
originally contemplated must be utilized for necessary attorney and witness fees.' Because such additional, unanticipated expenses may total
thousands of dollars, many plaintiffs may agree to an undesired settlement of their claim, or decide that the practical economics of their case
force them to drop their cause of action."
Recently courts have begun to question whether denial of access to
the courts because of one's inability to pay litigation costs is unconstitutional. Virtually all such cases have centered upon the constitutionality
of imposing filing fees upon indigent plaintiffs when such imposition
operates to foreclose their suits."
The most recent United States Supreme Court case in this area is
Boddie v. Connecticut." In Boddie, the Court held that Connecticut
denied indigent plaintiffs due process of law when the state required them
to pay filing fees approximating $60 per party in order to bring an action
for divorce. In essence, the Court, through Justice Harlan, held that:
(1) where the state has monopolized the means of resolving a dispute
(i.e., divorce), and (2) where the underlying right or relationship affected by denial of access to the courts is "fundamental" (i.e., marriage),
the prerequisite of fee payment denies due process of law to those who
cannot afford to pay.'
9. See note 8 supra.
10. The possibility of a party having to discontinue his suit because of additional
travel ,expenses resulting from a change of venue has been noted by at least one federal
court considering a motion for change of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Beach
v. National Football League, 331 F. Supp. 249 (S.D. N.Y. 1971).
11. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); O'Brien v. Trevethan,
336 F. Supp 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Matter of Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y.
1971), prob. juris. noted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972) ; Hart v. Superior Court, 16 Ariz. App.
184, 492 P.2d 433 (1972); McCandless v. McCandless, 38 App. Div. 2d 171, 327
N.Y.S.2d 896 (1972). For a general discussion of the problems faced by indigent
parties in obtaining access to the courts, see Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal
Protection, Due Process Standards, and the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the
Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goodpaster].

12. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
13. Id. at 382-83. In a concurring opinion, Justice Douglas stated that the case
should have been decided on equal protection grounds. Id. at 386. Justice Brennan also
concurred, but stated that the result was correct in both its equal protection and its
due process analyses. Id. at 388.
Several notes have been written on the reasons for the majority's use of a due
process analysis rather than equal protection analysis in invalidating the Connecticut fee
requirements. See, e.g., Note, 20 KAN. L. REv. 554 (1972); Note, 17 N.Y. L. F. 634
(1971); Note, 46 TUL. L. Rav. 799 (1972). The conclusions have not been uniform.
The majority did not explain its failure to use the equal protection clause. Apparently
the Court desired to put some limitation on the case's applicability as precedent, intend-
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The precise phraseology of Justice Harlan's holding seems to restrict
the application of the due process clause to disputes which must necessarily invoke the legal process to achieve resolution (e.g., divorce and
bankruptcy proceedings). However, Harlan's opinion, taken in its entirety, suggests that Boddie's application may be much wider.'4 Indeed,
it appears that Boddie must be extended to apply to all civil cases in
which a state imposes fees, or grants unjustified motions, which have the
practical effect of denying a plaintiff access to the judicial system.
That the logical extension of Boddie's reasoning compels this conclusion has been suggested by Justices Brennan and Black. In response to
Boddie's first restriction, that the action be such that resort to the
judicial process is the only way to resolve the dispute, Justice Brennan,
concurring, stated: "As a practical matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled between the parties, the court system is usually 'the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes. .

.

.' "'5

Equally

pertinent is Justice Black's comment, in another case, that "the judicial
process is the exclusive means through which almost any dispute can
ultimately be resolved short of brute force."'"
The second restriction, that there must be a fundamental right or
relationship affected by the denial of access, involves the difficult problem
of defining "fundamental rights under due process." Harlan's majority
opinion specifically refused to go further than necessary to dispose of
Boddie's facts by stating that the Court was not deciding that denial of
access to the courts violates due process in all circumstances.' However,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has already stated
that access to the courts is itself a fundamental right, 8 implying that
ing thereby to prevent its extension to all aspects of civil litigation which have an
unequal impact upon persons because of their financial status. Even if the due process
analysis of Boddie is extended in the manner discussed in this note, there may be
certain limitations which would not be present if an equal protection analysis were
available. For example, fee requirements imposed upon criminal defendants for filing
an appeal have been held in violation of the equal protection clause. However, even
though the right to initial access to the courts may be held to be a fundamental right
under the due process clause, the right of a plaintiff to appeal a civil case may not be
considered such. Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (wherein the Court stated
that the states are not required to provide appellate review at all; the opinion implies
that the right to appeal is not in itself a fundamental right under the due process
clause).

14. 401 U.S. at 374-377.
15. Id. at 387.

16. Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 957, denying cert. to 225 Ga. 91, 166

S.E.2d 88 (1971).
17. 401 U.S. at 382.

18. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

In addition, Justice

Brennan, concurring in Boddie, opined that initial access to the courts should be con-

sidered a fundamental right under the due process clause. 401 U.S. at 387. More-
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effective denial of access violates due process in any civil case. Moreover,
the Indiana constitutional requirement that "[a]ll Courts shall be open;
and every man, for injury done him .
shall have remedy" 9
suggests that the right is both guaranteed and fundamental in Indiana,
and therefore protected under a due process analysis in state courts. Short
of saying that access to the courts is a fundamental right, it should
be noted that many plaintiffs seek the aid of the courts in search of a
remedy against unlawful deprivation of their property."0 Thus, it could
also be argued that fundamental property interests will be adversely affected by denying access to the courts. 2
The logic of Boddie and its progeny2 2 appears to apply where a
plaintiff is effectively precluded from pursuing his case because an unjustified change of venue has created additional expenses which he cannot afford. This conclusion seems particularly true if a defendant refuses
to settle a claim after his motion for change is granted. Since plaintiff
now has no recourse but the court in settling the dispute, Boddie's first
requirement is satisfied. Furthermore, the expenses resulting from a
change of venue can easily exceed the $60 filing fee struck down in
Boddie.2" Even if other additional costs are minimal, personal traveling
over, Justice Black stated in Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co. that if Boddie is to remain
law, it should apply to all civil cases. 402 U.S. at 954 n.1.
A wealth of Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that an opportunity
for a meaningful hearing is a constitutional right. Although these precedents have
usually referred to defendants' rights, they can plausibly be extended to hold that
"initial access" is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965); Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27
(1885). Furthermore, it has been argued that the right of initial access to the courts
is ingrained in certain provisions of the Constitution, viz. art. 3, §§ 1-3, art. 4, § 1,
amend. VI, and amend. VII. Goodpaster, .mpranote 11, at 250.
19. IND. CoNsr. art. 1, § 12.
20. To limit the concept of due process to defensive action is . . . to
ignore the manifold ways in which property can be taken without reliance on
court process, and for which the courts provide a remedy to financially able
individuals.
Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEo. L.J.
253,288 (1968).
21. See U.S. CoNs. amends. V, XIV.
22. O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Matter of Kras,
331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972) ; Hart
v. Superior Court, 16 Ariz. App. 184, 492 P.2d 433 (1972) ; McCandless v. McCandless,
38 App. Div. 2d 171, 327 N.Y.S.2d 896 (1972). See also Thompson v. Thompson, Ind. - ,286 N.E.2d 657 (1972).
23. In Lake County, the average additional cost to plaintiffs whose case is
venued to another county exceeds 200 dollars. Relator's Motion to Strike Defendant's
Motion for Change of Venue at 40, State ex rel. Bicanic v. Lake Circuit Court, Civil
No. 472-S-44 (Ind. S. Ct., filed Apr. 18, 1972). Expenses may greatly exceed 200
dollars. See note 8 supra. The fact that public or private funds are available to
defray these additional costs is apparently not significant under the Boddie due
process analysis. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 n.2 (1971).
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expenses alone could justify a holding that granting the change without
cause violates the due process rights of plaintiffs unable to bear such
expenses.2 4
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in Indiana's change of venue
provisions is the complete lack of a legitimate state interest to balance
against the rights of persons adversely affected by a change without
cause. Under any due process formulation, if the state's interests are
"legitimate," and there are no reasonable alternatives which will effectuate these interests more fairly, the challenged provision may be upheld. 5
Indiana's legitimate interest in granting a change of venue extends only
to insuring a fair trial to the litigants. 28 In cases where an adequate
cause is present, a change of venue serves this purpose. Conversely,
where a legitimate cause does not exist, no change is warranted. Indeed,
granting change in those circumstances harms the interests of the state
by taldng up unnecessary time and money in transferring the case. Therefore, legitimate state interests can only be furthered by a requirement
that the moving party show cause.
There are alternatives to the present rule which could be utilized to
further the legitimate interests of the state while minimizing interference
with the plaintiff's rights. Safeguards against abuse of the venue change
process are available, as evidenced by the wide variety of provisions for
change of venue in other states.27 Indiana is unique in granting venue
changes from the county regardless of cause. Thus, Trial Rule 76 as
it is presently formulated should be held unconstitutional where its application effectively denies a plaintiff's access to the courts.
24. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that a required
expenditure of $1.50 may unconstitutionally preclude a person from exercising his
fundamental right to vote. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
25. Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires, at a minimum,
that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons

forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
401 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
Requiring a balancing of interests may negate the argument that if change of
venue provisions are held unconstitutional, states could logically be required to build
additional court houses near poorer communities so that poor people are not deprived
of their right to free access to the courts. The interest of the state in utilizing resources
for something other than court houses would probably be deemed to outweigh the slight
benefit to poor people.
26. State ex rel. Fox v. LaPorte Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 69, 74, 138 N.F.2d 875,
878 (1956); Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Naugle, 130 Ind. 79, 80-81, 29 N.E.
393, 394 (1891) ; cf. State ex rel. Kielpikowski v. Murray, 240 Ind. 222, 163 N.E2d 597
(1960) ; State ex rel. Janelle v. Lake Superior Court, 237 Ind.3, 143 N.E.2d 288 (1957).
27. For a discussion of provisions of various states, see Proposed Reforms, supra

note 4, at 298-299.
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DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT A REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD -

DEFENDANTS

If a defendant cannot bear the additional costs of following his case
to another county, an overreaching plaintiff may utilize change of venue
as a lever to compel the defendant to forfeit or make an unfair settlement.2 8 Thus, Trial Rule 76 may have the practical effect of depriving a
defendant of a reasonable opportunity to be heard in court.
It has been 96 years since the Supreme Court stated that merely
giving notice to a defendant of a claim against him was not sufficient to
validate a judgment against his property.29 The defendant must also be
given a reasonable opportunity to be heard: "Wherever one is assailed
in his person or his property, there he may defend, for the liability
and the right are inseparable.""0 Since 1876, most cases in this area
have focused on the adequacy of notice"' and on temporary pre-hearing
deprivations of property." However, several recent cases suggest that
the right to be heard may be extended to situations in which a defendant
is effectively denied such opportunity by the imposition of unjustified
expenses. The United States Supreme Court has held that requiring
expenses incidental to appeals by criminal defendants who could not pay
such expenses denied them equal protection of the law." The fundamental interest of preserving one's liberty weighed quite heavily in these
cases.
Similarly, several lower courts have weighed the fundamental
interests of property and found that economic discrimination which
precludes an adequate defense of one's property also violates equal protection. In Lee v. Habib,"' the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals held that requiring payment for a transcript on appeal from a
28. Indiana requires a plaintiff to initiate his action in a forum of "preferred
venue," which usually proves to be convenient to the defendant. IND. TPIAL R. 75.
However, a plaintiff can easily evade this requirement by subsequently moving for a
change of venue under Trial Rule 76.
29. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876).
30. Id. at 277.
31. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Schroeder v. New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950).
32. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (suspension of welfare
benefits pending hearing) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(pre-hearing wage garnishment) ; Randone v. Appellate Dept., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971) (pre-hearing attachment of checking account).
33. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1972); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.
708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
34. 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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civil judgment may deny equal protection.8" The court stated:
The equal protection clause applies to both civil and criminal
cases; the Constitution protects life, liberty and property. It
is the importance of the right to the individual, not the technical
distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case."
The court also cited Supreme Court decisions extending the rationale
of equal protection to certain proceedings traditionally considered civil,
to wit, coram nobis37 and habeas corpus" proceedings. The appellate
court then concluded: "Although these types of cases might fairly be
characterized as criminal, they do show that the civil-criminal distinction
is not the touchstone of equal protecton."' 3 In Spring v. Little," the
Supreme Court of Illinois held that a statute requiring a bond as a prerequisite to an appeal from an eviction proceeding violated equal
protection when the requirement was applied to defendants who could
not afford to pay the fees.4"
Apparently, no decisions have considered the equal protection clause
in relation to costs required in initially defending a claim.2 Undoubtedly,
this is because defendants are not required to pay filing fees which might
limit their access to the courts. Nonetheless, the argument that the equal
protection clause should be applied in this area is stronger than in Lee
and Spring, for in those decisions the defendant had already been afforded an initial hearing on the merits. Venue change may preclude
even this initial hearing.
In addition to equal protection, a defendant who is kept out of court
35. Id. at 904.
36. Id. at 901 (emphasis added).
37. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963).
38. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969).

39. 424 F2d at 901.
40. 50 I1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
41. Id. at 355, 280 N.E.2d at 211.
42. This question was touched on in Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S. 1037, denying
cert. to 222 Ga. 334, 149 S.E.2d 668 (1967). Similar to Boddie on the facts, Williams
dealt with a summary eviction statute which provided that upon the landlord's filing
of an affidavit stating that the tenant had held over or failed to pay rent, a dispossession
warrant was to be issued. The only way for the tenant to arrest the proceedings was
to tender a bond, with security, for the payment of such sum as might be recovered
against him at trial. Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren, dissented from
the majority's denial of certiorari, which was based on the ground of mootness. To
support his view that the statute deprived defendant of equal protection of the law,

Justice Douglas stated, "[tihe effect of the security statute is to grant an affluent
tenant a hearing and to deny an indigent tenant a hearing." 385 U.S. at 1039.
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because of a change of venue may seek recourse under a Boddie due
process analysis. A defendant obviously satisfies the first requirement of
Boddie in that legal action is the only way to resolve the dispute. As
Justice Harlan has stated:
[W]e think appellants' plight, because resort to the state
courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion from the only
forum effectively empowered to settle their disputes.4"
Boddie's second criterion, that there be a fundamental right affected by
the denial of due process, is also met, since defense of a civil action usually
involves one's constitutional right against deprivation of property. Thus,
it appears that when a change of venue without cause deprives a party
of a reasonable opportunity to defend, the change clearly violates constitutional protection, for under both due process and equal protection
analyses there is no legitimate state interest which can outweigh the
defendant's right to be heard.4
THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

Probably the most common abuse of Rule 76 is its widespread use
as a dilatory tactic.45 A person may get a change of venue from the
county and then move for a similar change from the judge. If court
40
calendars are crowded, delay for several months is a distinct possibility.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by Article I, § 12 of the
Indiana Constitution. Most litigation regarding this provision has been
in the criminal area. 7 However, the Indiana Supreme Court has discussed the guarantee in reference to civil actions involving the pre-1964
Indiana change of venue rule, which required a specific allegation of
cause. In City of Evansville v. Baumeyer4 the court stated, in dictum,
that a desire for delay is not a proper cause for seeking a change of venue
from the county. The court refused to sanction further abuse of the
right to change of venue, adding that such a delay would be in deroga43. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
44. See text accompanying notes 25 & 26 supra.
45. See notes 6, 7 & 8 supra & text accompanying.
46. In New York, where judges can exercise discretion in passing upon a motion
for change of venue, the courts, in considering motions, take into account the length
of the relevant court calendars and the procedural delays involved in changing venue.

See, e.g., Scaccia v. County of Onondaga, 11 Misc. 2d 907, 175 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).

47. See, e.g., Chelf v. State, 223 Ind. 70, 58 N.E.2d 353 (1944); State v. Beckwith, 222 Ind. 618, 57 N.E.2d 193 (1944).
48. 245 Ind. 643, 199 N.E.2d 472 (1964).
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tion of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. 49
When Baumeyer was decided, the requirement of cause represented
at least one safeguard against abuse of the change of venue rule. By
removing that safeguard and promulgating Trial Rule 76, the court
has sanctioned further abuse. If Baumeyer indicates the maximum
abuse that will be tolerated, the 1964 change surely permits that limit
to be surpassed and therefore Trial Rule 76 may be unconstitutional as
being in derogation of the right to a speedy trial."
CONCLUSION

Originally, an affidavit showing cause was a prerequisite to a change
of venue in Indiana. This requirement was designed to minimize the
risk of mischief and delay." The possibility of perjury and disbarment
were thought to be sufficient safeguards against abuse." Although such
safeguards were not always effective, "3 this does not justify their elimination. Today, change of venue in Indiana is terribly vulnerable to abuse.
Even if venue change does not entirely preclude a person from having
his day in court, it is an extremely useful tool for pressuring one's adversary. Also, unjustified changes impose unwarranted time and expense on parties, attorneys, and the state.
The Indiana change of venue provisions should be altered to approach the model presently utilized in the federal system and the majority
of states."4 There should be no absolute right to venue change, and the
trial judge should have discretion in weighing the facts alleged by both
sides. The judge's ruling on a motion should not be overturned unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion and, in order to minimize delay, an
appeal of the ruling should be allowed only after final judgment in the
lower court. If bias of the judge is alleged, a different judge should pass
on the motion. Although there may be problems involved in such an
approach, none could match those potentially resulting from the present
49. Id. at 649, 199 N.E.2d at 475.
50. It may seem illogical for the Indiana Supreme Court to invalidate one of
its own rules. However, the court has stated that its power is limited to promulgating
rules which do not affect substantive rights. Square D. Co. v. O'Neal, 225 Ind. 49, 72
N.E.2d 654 (1947). It has been noted that it is difficult to decide the constitutionality
of a court rule until its full impact has become evident. Joiner & Miller, Ruies of
Practiceand Procedure: A Study of Judicial Ride Making, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 623, 629
(1957). In view of the abuses of Trial Rule 76, therefore, it would not be illogical for
the court to hold that the rule, as applied in certain circumstances, unconstitutionally
infringes upon the right to a speedy trial.
51. See note 3 supra & text accompanying.
52. See note 3 supra.
53. Supra note 6.
54. See materials cited in ProposedReforms, supra note 4, at 298-99 n.45-52.
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system.
It is arguable whether the court or the legislature is the proper
body to correct Indiana's change of venue rule. It has been held that
venue change is purely statutory,5 since the right involved is substantive. 6 Therefore, it would appear that only the legislature can formulate
new provisions. However, from 1955 to 1969, change of venue was
regulated by court rules and these rules conflicted with the corresponding
statute.5" Presumably, what the court has changed by its own rule, it
can change back by a similar rule. Therefore, it can be argued that the
court has the power to alter the present venue change provisions, at
least to coincide with those of the original statute.
In any event, until some change is effected, either by the court or
the legislature, Indiana's change of venue procedures will continue to
endanger the principles of due process of law and the right to a fair
trial for all.
JAME-s R. PIELEMEIER
55. State ex rel. Young v. Niblack, 229 Ind. 509, 99 N.E.2d 252 (1951); State
ex rel. Neal v. Superior Court, 202 Ind. 456, 174 N.E. 732 (1931).
56. State ex rel. Blood v. Gibson Circuit Court, 239 Ind. 394, 157 N.E.2d 475

(1959).

57. See notes 1, 3, 4 & 5 supra. Whether the change from requiring an affidavit
specifically stating cause to requiring only an unverified application or motion without
stating cause was a change of procedure, within the court's power, or of substantive
law, outside the power of the court, apparently became a moot question when the
legislature passed its own version of the rules of procedure in 1969. The legislature's
change of venue rule (Rule 82.1) is the same as Trial Rule 76. IND. CODE § 34-5-1-1
(1971).

